(This article was originally published as a series of posts on “La Senyera”, formerly “FC Barcelona- Blaugrana Central.)

Juege de Posicion

Juego de Posicion is a philosophy with fundamental idea being the search of superiority. “Positional Play does not consist of passing the ball horizontally, but something much more difficult: it consists of generating superiorities behind each line of pressure. It can be done more or less quickly, more or less vertically, more or less grouped, but the only thing that should be maintained at all times is the pursuit of superiority. Or to put it another way: create free men between the lines.” – from an interview of Marti Perarnau.

BUILDING FROM THE BACK

“Look for the third man to be able to turn and face the play” – Juan Manuel Lillo

To begin with let’s take a look at the systems. In the first two seasons Pep’s Barça used a proper 4-3-3. Towards the end of his tenure though, i.e. in his last two seasons systems became more fluid than ever. Dani Alves’ role changed altogether and with the arrival of Fabregas, it changed to a 3-4-3.

2010-11– 4-3-3 against Manchester United

2011-12– 3-4-3 against Santos

“Juego de Posicion is about gaining Superiorities.” We have heard this many times, read a few hundred times; “But how is the Superiority gained?” is a more basic question. There are different types of superiorities to talk about- Numerical, Positional, Qualitative etc. The search of superiority began through 3 P’s. Position, Possession and Pressure. When on the ball Barça played through 3 phases of possession. Here we will deal with the first phase of possession, i.e. Building from the back.

On a football pitch you are looking to gain any advantage you can. Like the opposition, you only have access to 11 players so you must use these players as efficiently as possible. If one of them has no role other than babysitting the net, then you’re already at a disadvantage. Here comes the importance of ball playing Goalkeepers into the picture. Thus you should be using your goalkeeper not just to stop opponents from scoring, but to start the build ups and thus gain Numerical Superiority right from the start. When ball was with Victor Valdes, Barça rarely bypassed the first phase of possession. Victor Valdes played the ball short and the build up began. And thus this gives us the new conception of the so called “attack”. A team is in the phase of attack when it has the ball, and in phase of defense the moment it looses the ball. The position on the pitch simply doesn’t matter.

Full backs pushing high and Central defenders fanning out not just to provide passing options but providing numerical superiority in midfield as well, meant this lead to an advantageous path to opponent’s goal. All the players had the excellent ability to play under pressure from opponents, instilled through continuous training in “rondos.” This helped us stretch the opponent lines and create free men between them, thus facilitating a lethal attack. This is how building from the back has actually more to do about attack and not defense.

The first image shows Barça’s typical shape when ball was with Valdes. The Full Backs pushed upwards, the Centre Backs spread to each side, with Busquets (the pivot) dropping between the two. He is the key player here. Look at the triangles and rhombuses formed. Any player in this phase thus has 2 to 3 passing options. This helped move the ball quickly and surpass opponent’s high initial press.

Hence, if the opponent’s wide men pressed full backs and one or two forwards pressed any of the two from two CBs and the pivot, Valdes would still have the key to gain numerical superiority with a free man to pass the ball. The video attached shows how Valdes would help create 3v2 situations.

Let’s consider a case. Suppose the ball were in first phase of possession. Pedro and Villa maintaining a high and wide position meant opponent’s Full backs were forced to mark them. So, if oppponent’s wide men and forwards pressed the full backs and Centre Backs respectively, Busquets would still be available for Valdes to pass the ball to.

Alternatively, if the ball was passed to a CB and if the other CB was not a feasible passing option, Busquets would drop between the two CBs as another passing option. This idea of using a pivot in first phase of possession is called “LA SALIDA LAVOLPIANA” named after the great Mexican manager Ricardo Lavolpe.

Thus the idea meant in reality, that in first phase of possession the team had 3 players at the back; either two Centre Backs with pivot or Dani Alves pushing high up the pitch with Abidal, Pique and Puyol at the back. Here is Pep, in an interview with Marti Perarnau explaining the idea himself- “Playing out with three men at the back is very useful because it conditions the response of your rival. Even if they press you, it’ll be with their centre-forward and second striker, obliging them to move into a 4-4-2 shape and you can therefore over-run them by achieving superiority.” The second image shows barça’s three at the back against Santos in 2011.

Thus the search for Numerical Superiorities in the form of small 2v1 or 3v2 overloads all over the pitch begins with First phase of possession. The third graphic explains the scenario. The red area moves as the superiority is achieved progressively in various parts of the field. The video shows this same situation from the graphic in a live game.

Hence to sum up, this way the first phase of possession helped gain the Numerical Superiority right from the start. It thus served as a base to moving the ball to the middle third the way Pep expected and hence to gain positional superiority in midfield. What happens in the middle third?

COMBINATIONS IN THE MIDDLE THIRD

Earlier I talked about the superiorities- Numerical, Positional and Qualitative. Of the three, positional superiority would be established mainly in the middle third i.e. the midfield. It is the most difficult to achieve. Positional superiority implies effective use of space. The simplest implication of Positional superiority is “creating free men between the lines.”

The four most important aspects of the combinations in the middle third that we will cover are- 1) Staggering, 2) Stretching the opposition lines mostly using sideways and backward (basically indirect) passes, 3) Side overloads, 4) The role of the Midfield Diamond.

Before we go into the detail, let’s take a look at how Pep sees a pitch. Football as we all know is a ball sport. But the ball is just the means. The more basic aim is exploiting the finite space of the field and outmaneuvering the opponent. Thus to use the space optimally, players position themselves at various heights and depths. This staggering helps create interior channels and passing lanes within opposition formation. Pep has this specific training pitch for his players. See the following image. Look at the four rectangles between the centre and wings. This is where the players between the lines play. The outermost vertical strips are the Wings, central strip is obviously the centre and the strips between the two are the Half-Spaces. Half Spaces are of utmost importance to Pep’s game.

Pep trains his players to move in these zones that he has created. The rest of the team reacts to the movement of the players near the ball and moves continuously such that the shape of the team or the structure is the most efficient and the most stable. Two rules apply. Not more than 3 players in the same horizontal line and not more than 2 in vertical.

People like to relate possession to Pep’s Barça. But it wasn’t possession for the sake of it. “There is only one ball on the pitch. So you should have it.”- Johan Cruijff. Josep Guardiola is a perfectionist, a fantasist. He knows Perfection doesn’t exist. But he will strive for it anyway, to get as close as he can. Thus possession is not just to deprive the opponent of the ball. He wants possession because “he wants the ball to do the work.” He doesn’t want his players to move behind the ball, but move the ball to make space.

“Look for spaces. All day; I’m always looking. Here? No. There? Space, space, space. I see the space and pass. Whoever has the ball is the master of the game.” -Xavi Hernandez. Barça controlled the game by using the ball. This is PROACTIVE Football and not reactive. Barça monopolized the ball, moved it around the field, from slow intricate and indirect passing to suddenly increasing the tempo. Thus, Barcelona decided the way their opponents played. Their proactive game made the opponents react. The ball was passed with the purpose of moving the opponent and thus create space. That’s the meaning of the quote- “Let the ball do the work.” So unlike what people see or think, possession is actually a consequence of the philosophy, the thought process. And that is the reason we hate it when they try to assign the word Tiki-Taka with Barça. Tiki-Taka is moving the ball for the sake of it. It’s a tool. Not the philosophy or system.

Within the structures created when on the ball the main idea is creating triangles and diamonds. EXACT Formation is not really a factor of importance. To Pep what is important is efficient coverage of the field in relation to the ball. Formation of triangles allows players to have better orientation on the field and creates uniformity in the movement. The below image perfectly shows the staggering structure and also the triangles thus formed. Messi and Iniesta in half spaces means Busquets can move forward and create a 3v2. Also, this staggering structure also means better structure while counterpressing. Counterpressing will be covered later as we proceed. However this highlights a point- Offensive and Defensive actions cannot really be separated in Positional Play.

“One step backwards in order to take two steps forwards”. The below video shows how Barça used backward passes effectively to destroy the disorganised press from Santos. Alves and Thiago maintaining width pinned back Santos’ full backs and thus gave the midfielders the vital space in the half spaces to exploit.

“The secret is to overload one side of the pitch so the opponent must tilt its own defense to cope. When they have done that, we attack and score from other side.”- Pep. As we have seen, every single action on the ball takes place with a purpose. The ball doesn’t move just to move. The purpose is to move the opponent. One such way is moving the ball such that the opponents gather on one flank and then releasing it when possible to attack from the underloaded side. The free man is of importance. Once any side has been overloaded, the unmarked man on the other side is the key. Having a sound structure is of importance here. The team needs players deeper in half spaces and centre to provide switch and also a player in advanced position on the opposite flank to attack. The video shows two such examples.

Finally we talk about the Midfield Diamond, which means the diamond of Busquets, Iniesta, Xavi and Messi; the celebrated False 9. Before Pep, Messi used to play on the Right wing. He was already a great player playing on RW, but moving Messi in the centre was a masterclass and it ended up maximizing Messi’s potential taking his already stratospheric talent to a whole new plane of existence. As the team caught up with pre-Pep Barça they started overcrowding the wings to deprive Messi of space. Pep noticed this and moved him in the centre. Pep believed in having his best players in the centre.

Obviously, the false 9 isn’t a traditional muscular number 9 who comes at the end of crosses and feeds off through balls.

The false 9 is part of Pep’s positional play theory, creating superiorities between the lines of pressure through organized movement and rapid passing. Dropping between the lines, his positioning created havoc. The opposition CBs never knew whether they should mark him or maintain their position. Marking him meant leaving space behind them for the inside forwards to use (Henry, Eto’o, Villa, Pedro…). Maintaining positions meant they had greatest player running at them with the ball.

At least one of the passing options was thus between the lines of the opposition midfield and defence. Guardiola struck upon the idea the night before Barcelona’s title-deciding Clasico against Real Madrid at the Bernabeu in May 2009. “Pep noticed how much pressure the Madrid midfielders Guti, Fernando Gago and Royston Drenthe put on his own players, Xavi and Yaya Toure,” wrote Marti Perarnau in Pep Confidential. “He also noticed the tendency of the central defenders, Cannavaro and Metzelder, to hang back near Iker Casillas’ goalmouth. This left a vast expanse of space between them and the Madrid midfielders – a vast, empty space.”

The pivot, Sergio Busquets is the integral part of this system. As we have seen in the first post of this series how Busquets is of importance in the first phase of possession. Here we talk about his role in the second phase. Dropping deeper than where a Defensive Midfielder or a destroyer plays, Busquets is the regista. He creates space in front of him. As Cruijff used to say, “Sometimes the best way to help a team is actually moving away from him.” The space Busi created helped Xavi thrive. Busquets remains an important player in organisation of the team and recirculation of the ball. As a regista, he recycles possession, distributes the ball, helps switch the game through centre and thus serves as a focal point in attack. He is also great defensively, pressing the ball well and intercepting with his excellent understanding of the game being a step ahead of the others.

Lastly the two carrileros- Iniesta and Xavi. Iniesta is a carrier, who plays in slightly advanced position in left half space. He could use his dribbling and passing linking with Messi. Xavi is the controller, played slightly deeper in the right half space. The diamond would thus become skewed. See the next image where the skewed diamond is seen (In Blue). He decided the tempo of the game. With his outrageous vision to find space and absolutely unbelievable passing he developed the game, kept the ball moving and also at times not just him but also Busi and Iniesta would perform the famous La Pausa, to suddenly stop the play… as if it were a pause in a composition to come up with a new melody.

The diamond got the freedom because of wingers constantly maintaining width. Pedro and Villa would force opposition stay wide thus allowing the team play through the middle. The Fullbacks (Dani and Abidal) overlapped with wingers. Almost hugging the touchline, they increased the width in attack. In fact marauding the right flank up and down, towards the end Dani became a false midfielder and in fact as the system changed to 3-4-3 almost a Right winger.

THE FINAL THIRD

It was in this final attacking phase where Barcelona appeared the most lethal and ruthless. Much of their success in this phase was down to the natural talent and instinct of some of the most creative players the world has ever seen. Let’s take a look at various combinations Barça used in the final third.

We first take a look at the positioning of players in final third. Pep was very very specific about the positioning in the first two phases of possession. Holding your position was vital. It was in the middle third that the system came to life with players given the freedom to take the runs. So, in a sense, the freedom in the final third was because of the perfect positioning in the first two phases. The wingers stayed out wide allowing the midfielders the vital space in centre. But in the final phase, they supported Messi with diagonal runs or dribbled the ball and cut inside to finish.

In fact, as Dani Alves was converted more and more into a false midfielder, he gave so much width that the right winger could actually stay more central. We can see this in the match against United. Dani Alves helped Villa stay central engaging the two CBs, thus giving Messi the much needed freedom against Vidic and Ferdinand.

Now the combinations.

Dribble + Release: Most commonly used by Messi and Iniesta who would dribble in front of the opposition penalty area, attracting opposition defenders, and then release a pass to a player in the space which is created.

Small combination triangles- This is where the instinctive first touches and flicks developed through the 7v2 Rondos that took place in training every day came to fruition on the field of play. Having these structures in the final phase allowed players to make one-touch passes and play at speed to penetrate the opposition.

Third man runs- Barcelona use third-man runs to breach the opposition’s defensive line. The benefit of this run starting deep is that the runner is already moving at pace by the time the ball is played so can stay onside and still receive the ball in space behind even the deepest of defensive lines.

Final ball from the half space- And this by far was the most spectacular of all. Barcelona tried to create space for Xavi and Iniesta in the halfspaces to play the final ball over the top of the defence. Playing the ball from the half space gives the optimal angle of pass for the runner (Fabregas in the second clip) to receive. A ball from the flank (a cross) travels further distance and is at a flatter angle so is easier for the defence to cut out. While a pass from the centre would have to come over Fabregas’ shoulder so would be harder for him to control. Plus, when in the central column of the field, the opposition defence are standing with a 180-degree view of the whole field whereas when a ball is played half space to half space (see second clip), Fabregas has a blindside advantage.

If I were asked to point out the best example of this in recent days, Christian Eriksen would be the one.

The 1-2s- The one-twos are the most used combination in attack, the most effective to catch opponents off guard when they lose positon.

The below video shows the key strategies Barcelona use to penetrate a retreated defence, with explanation of these beneath.

With this, we now turn towards the defensive actions, pressing and counterpressing.

COUNTERPRESSING AND PRESSING

Earlier, we discussed about the Phases in Build Ups and Attack, basically all the ON THE BALL activities of Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona. Possession and Positioning were key tenets of Pep’s system and the greatest team ever created chances by patiently building up and holding onto the ball until they get it to the final third of the pitch where they enjoyed some kind of freedom that allowed creating havoc in the opposition’s defences.

Barcelona was always a team that hogged possession. They attacked with the ball, but they also defended with the ball. In 2nd post we discussed how the so called defense and attack are just two phases when you don’t have the ball and when you have the ball respectively. We also mentioned without going into the detail, the way staggering helped in regaining possession. Thus in Positional Play, defense and attack are just the two faces of the same coin.

“Guardiola’s Barcelona are the only team that defend with the ball; they rest in possession. They keep the ball so well, they move so collectively, that when you do get it back, you’re tired, out of position and they’re right on top of you.” -Juanma Lillo

From what ‘The Maestro’ said, you could guess that indeed, Pep’s Barcelona would eventually lose the ball, but it wouldn’t matter because the players would press to get it back. This brings us to the final key aspects of Pep’s system viz. Pressing and Gegenprersing.

What’s the difference between the two? Here we will take a look at it.

COUNTERPRESSING

“Do you know how Barcelona win the ball back so quickly? It’s because they don’t have to run back more than 10 metres as they never pass the ball more than 10 metres.”– Johan Cruyff
Counterpressing or Gegenpressing is different from pressing. Gegenpressing is German for Counterpressing. Once the ball is lost, multiple players would surround the player who just received the ball. When the ball is won back, the opponent will be caught off guard and in the middle of a transition. It’s used to create attacking opportunities while the opponent is vulnerable, and thus is more like countering the counter attack.

After taking charge of Barça, Pep introduced ‘The 6 seconds rule’. Once the ball is lost, all players near the ball would burst and participate in a manic pressing that would last 6 seconds at max, closing down on a vulnerable opponent who just received the ball and didn’t have enough time to fully realize his passing options. If the ball wasn’t won back in 6 seconds, the team would fold back and form a narrow compact block (with no more than 25-30 meters between the last CB and the highest player up the pitch). Shall the opposition try to play long, the offside trap would be triggered and the ball eventually won back. The presence of a sweeper keeper congests space more and if the offside trap isn’t effective every long ball would be swept out.

After the 6 seconds or while the opposition is trying to build from the back, Barça players would press and try to push the ball wide and use the touchline as an extra man to corner the player in possession, at times press the passing lanes rather than men. This approach resembles Marcelo Bielsa and Arrigo Sacchi’s.

The video demonstrates how Barcelona’s attacking structure allows them to counter press so effectively. It’s extremely rare that both Xavi and Iniesta will be on the last line. They tend to use a 2-1-4-3 shape in this phase of play.

The most significant tactical feature of the above video is the positioning of the ‘full-back’ on the opposite side to where the play begins. We can see how Abidal in the first clip and Alves in the second are tucked into the half space/centre. Pep has been using somethimg similar at City to prevent the counters and attain superiority in midfield. Although they would sometimes be used in this area of the field to help switch play from the centre, via the half space to either Pedro or Villa on the wing, this is more defensively-minded positioning. Having Abidal and Alves in this area in the final attacking phase shows the early stages of the ‘halfback’ role that Guardiola used successfully in his second and third year at Bayern Munich and at the beginning of his time at Manchester City. So in a sense, Guardiola is inverting the inverted pyramid.

Notice in both clips the important role Sergio Busquets has in the second phase of the counterpress, closing down the free option.

This system differs from Jürgen Klopp’s gegenpressing where he asks the players to chase or attack the ball. In Pep’s system the emphasis is again on the space rather than the ball. The pressure is applied in such a way that the opponent is either stifled or his passing options are cut. The emphasis is on making the opponent unable to gain an attacking structure.

PRESSING

Pressing is basically one or multiple players closing on the opponent in possession, pressuring him to commit an error. It’s used to get the ball back to reinitiate the build-up process.

Guardiola’s Barcelona would always press the opposition’s build-up play in all areas of the field. They would use similar techniques to that of their counterpress such as the use of cover-shadows and positioning to cover multiple passing lanes. Whereas their counterpress is more aimed at regaining possession as soon as possible by surrounding the area the ball is in, the aim of their pressing is to force the opposition to either make a rushed clearance or play to the wing. Once the ball is to an isolated player in wide area, Barcelona can use the touchline as an extra defender to force the opposition player to clear the ball or make a mistake.

They would often press their opposition’s first phase with their front three, with a second pressing wave of Barcelona’s midfield players marking the opposition’s midfield outlets. Barcelona’s front three would often find themselves pressing a four or five man build-up so would have to be intelligent in their positioning and movement to prevent the opposition progressing up the field.

The videos show some of the examples.

Conclusion
And thus, Guardiola’s Barcelona was the best team in history of Football, where results and aesthetics went hand in hand.

“I would rather be remembered for the football my teams play than the trophies I won”- Pep Guardiola’s this statement sums it up.

Winning 14 trophies from a possible 19, they were the epitome of effective yet entertaining football, something which only the greatest coaches of all time have been able to master. Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona were the absolute pinnacle of football.

“Quality without results is pointless. Results without quality is boring.”- Johan Cruijff

Credits for the videos to Tristan T, Twitter – @flyingwingback